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THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AS
REFEREE: THE STATES, THE INDIAN NATIONS,
AND HOW GAMBLING LEAD TO THE
ILLEGALITY OF THE SECRETARY OF THE
INTERIOR'S REGULATIONS IN 25 C.F.R. § 291
I. INTRODUCrION
Federal Indian law is one of the most complex and dynamic areas of
law in the United States.1 It is a unique area of federal law that exists
simultaneously at a time when many are demanding more rights for the
states.2 This combination makes controversy inherent. Indian gaming
was the catalyst that finally forced these three entities-the federal
government, the states, and the tribes-to work together Legal battles
were inevitable.
Indian gaming has developed over the last ten years to a point where
tribes have, for the first time in hundreds of years, become economically
independent.4 Gaming is now the largest revenue-producing activity for
Indian tribes,' and is also "generally considered the fastest-growing
segment of the gaming industry., 6 As these casinos have grown and
developed, conflicts among the tribes, states, and the federal
government have arisen.7 One of the primary issues of controversy is
1. William Bennett Cooper, III, What's in the Cards for the Future of Indian Gaming
Law, 5 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 129,129 (1998).
2. See Rebecca Tsosie, Symposium, Indian Gaming, Negotiating Economic Survival: The
Consent Principle and Tribal State Compacts Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 29
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 25,26 (1997).
3. See Generally Kathryn R. L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA
Shapes the Politics of Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA. J. Soc.
POLY & L. 381, 382-83 (1997).
4. Id at 382-8.
5. This does not mean every tribe benefits from gaming. Many tribes are not
geographically situated to operate a gaming operation and others have declined to engage in
gaming for moral or traditional reasons. William Cornelius, Oneida Indian Nation, member,
6. Joseph M. Kelly, Indian Gaming Law, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 501, 502 (1995). Indian
gaming revenues went from "$100 million in 1988 to $8.26 billion" ten years later. Associated
Press, Snake Eyes for Tribes (Aug. 31, 2000), http:llabcnews.go.comlsections/ us/Daly
News/casinos000831.html.
7. Anthony J. Marks, A House of Cards: Has the Federal Government Succeeded in
Regulating Indian Gaming?, 17 LoY. L.A. ENT. L. 157,157-58 (1996).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
the compacting process between states and tribes.' Recently, this
problem has led to new regulations by the Secretary of the Interior (the
Secretary).9  This Comment argues that these regulations are
unconstitutional because the Secretary has exceeded the authority of its
office.
In order to understand the relationships and parties involved in the
compacting process, one must first understand what Indian law is and
from where it originated. Part II of this Comment will give a brief
historical overview of Indian law leading up to the advent of Indian
casinos. This part will cover the case of Seminole Tribe v. Florida,'0
which created the necessity for the unconstitutional regulations by the
Secretary. Part III will outline the Secretary's regulations in 25 C.F.R. §
291 and explain why the Secretary of the Interior has exceeded the
authority given to it by Congress. Part IV offers a variety of possible
legal solutions to the situation created by the Seminole Tribe decision.
II. THE NATURE AND HISTORY OF INDIAN LAW
A. Historical Overview of Indian Law Leading to the Advent of Gaming
The term "Indian law" means different things to different people.
Legally, it is used to refer to the body of law dealing with the status of
Indian tribes and their relationship to the federal government." An
"Indian tribe" is the fundamental unit of Indian law.12  A tribe is
generally defined by federal law as consisting of a distinct and
historically continuous government entity. 13 The federal government
recognizes tribes by statute, treaty, or by executive or administrative
order.4 Although a tribe may be recognized in many ways,15 without
8. Id.
9. See Class III Gaming Procedures, 25 C.F.R. § 291 (2000).
10. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
11. See generally Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370,
375-77 (1st Cir. 1975).
12. Id. at 372.
13. See Golden Hill Paugussett Tribe of Indians v. Weicker, 39 F.3d 51, 57-59 (2d Cir.
1994).
14. See generally FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 2 (1986)
(providing information regarding what an Indian tribe is and who is an Indian).
15. A group of individuals with a cultural history may consider themselves a tribe,
although they lack federal recognition. Lack of federal recognition cannot deprive a group of
treaty rights. Today, federal courts review grants of recognition under the Administrative
Procedure Act to determine whether the Department of the Interior followed its own
regulations and other law in determining the status of a tribe. See Cherokee Nation of
[Vol. 84:685
2001] THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AS REFEREE 687
federal recognition the tribe is not subject to federal Indian law.16 If not
subject to federal law, a tribe is not entitled to the valuable services and
benefits offered by the Department of the Interior. 7
American Indian tribes and the federal government have a special
relationship. 8  The relationship consists of legal duties, moral
obligations, treaty obligations, and understandings that have arisen over
time.9 Federal Indian law is codified in Title 25 of the United States
Code, entitled "Indians."20
Notions of federalism create a unique situation where the reach of
state laws over tribes is limited.21 In the past, Indian tribes have been
characterized as a type of "domestic dependent" who rely on the federal
government for protection.' "[T]oday, Congress exercises plenary
power over Indian affairs."' This source of Congressional power is said
to come from the Indian Commerce Clause24 and the Supremacy
Clause.' The federal government's relationship to the tribes is
sometimes still classified as that of "trustee" or "guardian" and the
federal government carries out certain obligations towards the tribes
Oklahoma v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489,1499-1500 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
16. 25 U.S.C.
17. See Goldern Hill Paugussett Tribe, 39 F.3d at 57.
18. Sean Brewer, Note, Analysis of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in Light of
Current Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 469,471-80 (1995).
19. See COHEN, supra note 14, at 2-5.
20. See generally 25 U.S.C. There are also about 380 treatises, hundreds of opinions of
the Solicitor of the Department of the Interior, thousands of cases, and many law review
articles. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN
LAW 1 (West 4th ed. 1998). Further, there is controversy about the constitutionality of
allowing a race to have its own special laws. There is a legal fiction which justifies it by
claiming that "Indian" is a political term, not a racial one. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,
552-53 n.24. (1974).
21. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 388 (1976).
22. See Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113 (1919); see also Cramer v.
United States, 261 U.S. 219, 229 (1923) (stating that failure to protect the tribes rights would
be "contrary to the whole spirit of the traditional American policy toward these dependent
wards of the nation." The case also claimed that the United States had standing to assert the
Indians' interest, because of its position as guardian.) Id.
23. See Brewer, supra note 18,469.
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. This clause states that Congress has authority to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes .... Id.
25. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, c. 2, which states "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
Id.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
and their members.26
This trust relationship was originally considered the source of
Congressional power.27 In the early 1900s, the Supreme Court began to
enforce the federal trust responsibility toward Indians, and has done so
ever since.2 Indian law in some ways still revolves around this
relationship, although the limits are constantly changing, creating
uncertainty in the boundaries of the legal relationship.29
The states have a limited role in tribal relationships. The federal
government preempts state power in almost all situations.' It would be
simplistic, however, to say that state laws have no force in Indian
country.' Tribal sovereignty is a complicated and fluctuating concept.
To sum it up very briefly, state courts have a limited reach in Indian
Country. In general, courts have held tribes to have criminal and civil
jurisdiction over Indians on Indian land.2 Tribal sovereignty has been
limited when the issue of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians in Indian
territory arises. Civil transactions over non-Indians on tribal land have
generally been held to be within tribal authority, while the states
generally have criminal jurisdiction of a non-Indian in Indian territory.33
These distinctions vary on a state-to-state basis.
B. Cabazon to Seminole: States Plead the Eleventh
The current state of Indian gaming, as discussed above, grew out of
26. See generally Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286 (1942).
27. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564 (1903). The case involved a federal
statute and the distribution of land. Id. Tribal members attacked the statute claiming it was
inconsistent with a prior treaty requiring tribal member's consent. Id. The court ultimately
held that congress has plenary power over tribal relations. Id. at 568.
28. See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983); United States v. Mitchell, 445
U.S. 535, 542 (1980); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942); Lane v.
Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110, 113-114 (1919).
29. See generally Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
30. See Lane, 249 U.S. at 112-113.
31. See 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1994). "Indian county" is defined as:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government..., (b) all dependent Indian communities within the
borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired
territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all
Indian allotments ... which have not been extinguished.
Id.
32. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2) (1994); Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 694 (1990).
33. See Duro, 495 U.S. at 684.
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the conflict of jurisdiction among the federal government, the states, and
the tribes.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, several tribes began operating
commercial bingo or poker games on their reservations.' Because tribal
law is a federal area of law, these games did not conform to state law.35
In most cases, such operations required the enactment of a tribal
ordinance, which under the tribal constitution adopted pursuant the
Indian Reorganization Act, required the approval of the Secretary of
the Interior. 6 The Secretary approved several such ordinances.37 Soon
after, the states in which these games took place began to try to enforce
their laws regulating or prohibiting the tribal bingo operations.'
In 1987, one of these conflicts reached the United States Supreme
Court. In the landmark decision of California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians,39 the Supreme Court affirmed tribal sovereignty over
gambling activity on Indian reservations.4° This holding allowed tribes
to develop their reservation economies through gambling free of state
regulation." Tribal bingo and card operations began to grow.42 Some of
the tribes began to branch out into other forms of gambling.43 This
created more confusion. State gaming laws could not be applied to the
tribe or its members; however, state criminal law could presumably be
applied against the non-Indian customer.'
The chaos resulting from the Cabazon decision prompted Congress
to enact the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).45 The Act divides
gaming into three classes with different regulatory results for each
class.46 Class I gaming is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribes.47
34. GETCHES, supra note 20, at 739.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
40. Id. at 221-222.
41. Id. at 218-219.
42. Id.
43. GErCHES, supra note 20, at 749-53.
44. Id.
45. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1166 (1994).
46. 25 U.S.C. § 2703 (1994). Class I gaming consists of traditional forms of gaming
connected with tribal ceremonies. Class II gaming consists of bingo, pull tabs, certain card
games, lotto and other similar games. Class III gaming refers to anything not class I or II,
generally the high-stakes gambling games such as blackjack, slot machines, and roulette. Id.
47. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a)(1) (1994).
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Class II gaming is within the jurisdiction of the tribes, but is subject to
other restrictions of the IGRA and is subject to oversight by the
National Indian Gaming Commission (which was established by the
IGRA).48
To conduct Class III gaming, a tribe must first meet two
requirements that are required for Class II gaming: (1) there must be an
approved authorizing ordinance, and (2) the gaming must be located in
a state that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person,
organization, or entity.9 They must meet a third requirement, which is
the focus of this Comment. It requires that Class III gaming be
"conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by
the Indian tribe and the state.., that is in effect."''  Although the
parties are the state and tribe, the compact takes effect only when notice
of its approval by the Secretary of the Interior is published in the
Federal Register."
The IGRA also imposes upon the states a duty to negotiate in good
faith with a tribe wishing to enter a tribal-state compact.5 2 In order to
enforce this duty, the IGRA creates a federal cause of action that may
be initiated by an Indian tribe against a state that refuses to negotiate a
compact or that fails to negotiate in good faith. 3
When a tribe requests to enter into a compact, in the state in which it
is located, the alternative dispute resolution provisions of the IGRA are
triggeredi 4  There is a 180-day period during which the state must
negotiate with the tribe.5 After the 180 days, if the state refuses to
negotiate or fails to negotiate in good faith, the tribe can bring the
federal cause of action created by the IGRA.6 At that time, the state
has the burden to prove that they negotiated in good faith. 7
Unfortunately, the statute does not define "good faith. "M However,
48. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(b) (1994).
49. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1) (1994).
50. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(c) (1994).
51. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(B) (1994). Signing a compact will not avoid the effect of the
Johnson Act, forbidding the use or possession of gambling devices in Indian country, if a state
otherwise prohibits gambling devices entirely. See Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe
v. Green, 995 F.2d 179, 181 (10th Cir. 1993).
52. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1994).
53. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (1994).
54. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(A) (1994).
55. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(i) (1994).
56. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (1994).
57. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(ii) (1994).
58. 25 U.S.C. § 2703 (1994).
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it specifies that a court may consider factors such as the "public interest,
public safety, criminality, financial integrity, and adverse economic
impacts on existing gaming activities" when making the determination
whether good faith existed'
The IGRA also provides that if a court finds that the state did not
negotiate in good faith, the court shall order the state and tribe to
conclude a compact within sixty days.6 If the parties fail to reach an
agreement during this time period, they are required to submit their
"last best offer" to a compact mediator appointed by the federal court.
6 1
The mediator is required to accept whichever compact best comports
with the provision of applicable federal law and the IGRA.62 If the state
still fails to consent to the compact within the sixty days, then the
Secretary of the Interior, in consultation with the Indian tribe, has the
authority to prescribe procedures under which the Class Ill gaming
activity may take place.6 The procedures must be consistent with the
compact selected by the mediator and applicable state law.64 This has
led states to complain that this affords too much power to the tribes by
mandating state negotiation upon threat of litigation by the federal
government.6
The state's complaint reached the Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe
v. Florida.6 The Supreme Court previously held that the Eleventh
Amendment immunity of states from unconsented suit in federal court
extended to actions brought by tribal sovereigns. 7 Congress designed
IGRA intending, however, to waive the state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity.6 In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court held that Congress
lacked the power under the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity from unconsented suit in federal
court. This decision left tribes without any recourse if a state failed to
negotiate in good faith for a gaming compact.
59. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii)(I) (1994).
60. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (1994).
61. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iv) (1994).
62. Id.
63. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) (1994).
64. Id.
65. See Tsosie, supra note 2, at 55.
66. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
67. Blatchford v. Native Vii1. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
68. Joe Laxague, Indian Gaming and Tribal-State Negotiations: Who Should Decide the
Issue of Bad Faith?, 25 J. LEGIS 77, 81 (1999).
69. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72.
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The Seminole decision raises questions about the enforceability of
federal statutory rights far beyond the field of Indian law.70 For
example, Congress has enacted federal rights of action and has
specifically subjected states to suit in federal court in fields such as
environmental law, bankruptcy, and intellectual property.7'  The
Eleventh Amendment7 has been read very broadly, at least since 1964.'
However, the Seminole case, narrowly interpreted the Eleventh
Amendment.'
In the wake of the Seminole Tribe ruling, many scholars criticized
the Court's holding and proposed solutions to the problem of state non-
suability. This Comment will not specifically address the
questionability of the Seminole Tribe holding. It will instead focus only
on the possible solutions after this ruling. Although the Secretary has
now offered its own solution, initially there were many proposed
solutions. Possible solutions will be discussed in Part IV of this
Comment.
III. THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR'S REGULATIONS IN § 291:
WHAT THEY ARE AND WHY THEY ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Eventually, however, the Secretary of the Interior proposed and
passed rules for the creation of Class III gaming regulations in the
70. James E. Pfander, An Intermediate Solution to State Sovereign Immunity: Federal
Appellate Court Review of State-Court Judgments After Seminole Tribe, 46 UCLA L. REV.
161,162 (1998).
71. Id.
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
73. Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian Commerce Clause,
29 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3,4 (1997).
74. Id.
75. The Seminole ruling itself has many critics. See e.g., Pfander, supra note 70, at 162
(citing Martha A. Field, The Seminole Case, Federalism, and the Indian Commerce Clause, 29
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3 (1997)); S. Elizabeth Gibson, Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy: The Next
Chapter, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195 (1996); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh
Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex Parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495 (1997);
John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REV.
47 (1998); Kit Kinports, Implied Waiver After Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REV. 793 (1998);
Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SUP. Cr. REV.
1; Henry Paul Monaghan, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L. REV. 102
(1996); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J.
1683 (1997); Gordon G. Young, Comment, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 56 MD. L. REV. 1411
(1997).
[Vol. 84:685
2001] THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AS REFEREE 693
absence of a valid tribal-state compact.76 In sum, these regulations allow
the Secretary to approve a gaming compact after a suit is brought under
IGRA and the state has asserted its Eleventh Amendment right against
suit in federal court
A. The Regulations: What They are and How They Work
The new rules by the Secretary follow a similar negotiation process
as the one set out in IGRA." The difference is that they allow for the
unavailability of tribal access to federal courts if a state refuses to
negotiate in good faith, and then asserts its Eleventh Amendment right
to sovereign immunity by giving the Secretary the power to determine
bad faith and accept a compact.79 If the state does not plead the
Eleventh, then the provisions in IGRA would be carried out and the suit
in federal court will continue.80
Once a suit is dismissed from federal court because of the Eleventh
Amendment claim, then a tribe must submit a proposal to the Secretary
requesting gaming procedures in that state."' The Secretary then has
thirty days to notify the tribe that it is eligible for the procedures. The
Secretary must then notify the involved state of the tribe's proposed
procedures, including any comments on the scope of gaming.'
The state is allowed to submit an alternative procedure within sixty
days.'" If the state does not submit an alternative proposal, the
Secretary can then approve the regulations." If the state does offer an
alternative proposal, then a mediation process, similar to that outlined
in the IGRA, takes place.'
An appointed mediator will review the "last best proposal" from the
tribe and state. The mediator then recommends to the Secretary which
76. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703-10 (1994).
77. Id.
78. Class III Gaming Procedures, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,535-17,536 (April 12,1999).
79. 25 C.F.R. § 291.3 (2000).
80. Id.
81. 25 C.F.R. § 291.4. This proposal includes such things as the scope of the gaming
activities, a detailed regulatory plan for the gaming, and a legal analysis addressing state
prohibitions and other state policies on different types of gaming. Id.
82. 25 C.F.R. § 291.3 (2000).
83. 25 C.F.R. § 291.7 (2000).
84. Id.
85. 25 C.F.R. § 291.8 (2000).
86. 25 C.F.R. § 291.9 (2000).
87. 25 C.F.R. § 291.10 (2000).
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offer best comports with federal and state law." The Secretary then has
sixty days to approve or disapprove the mediator's suggestion. The
Secretary can reject the mediator's suggestion and prescribe procedures
that he/she thinks best conform to state and federal law.'
B. What is Wrong with These Procedures?
In the wake of the proposal of these rules, sixty-seven comments
were submitted in response." The states argued that the Secretary lacks
the legal authority necessary to create these regulations.92 It is true that
the tribes are left with no legal recourse when the states assert an
Eleventh Amendment defense to suit. And it is also clear Congress
intended the states to be required to negotiate in good faith.9 These
regulations, however, are not the solution to the problem. The
Secretary cites legal support for the authority to create these
regulations.' When this support is analyzed, the necessity for
alternative solutions becomes apparent. Comments sent in by states in
regard to the proposed rules voiced several concerns. 9'
The Secretary of the Interior is an administrative organization that
gets its power from grants of authority by the federal government.'
One of these grants of power was the role of the Secretary created in the
IGRA. The Secretary cites the IGRA in part for why he/she has the
authority to promulgate these regulations.' The Secretary relies on §
2710(d)(7)(B)(vii), claiming his/her authority to promulgate these
regulations arises from the Congressional grant of power given in the
IGRA.98
This section does in fact grant the Secretary the authority to
promulgate gaming compacts, but only after adjudication and mediation
have failed and there has been a judicial finding of bad faith on behalf of
the state.99 The new regulations basically require the Secretary to
88. Id.
89. 25 C.F.R. § 291.11 (2000).
90. Id.
91. Class III Gaming Procedures, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,537 (April 12, 1999).
92. Id.
93. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (1994).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Class III Gaming Procedures, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,536 (April 12, 1999).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See Laxague, supra note 68 at 85 (1999).
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determine if there was bad faith on behalf of the state in the negotiation
process.' The IGRA, on the other hand, contemplated Secretarial rule-
making only after the finding by a court of bad faith on the states.'°1
To understand why the Secretary cannot make this finding instead of
a court, consider the relationship between the federal government and
the tribes discussed in Part II." If you recall, the relationship between
these two entities has been characterized as a "federal trust
relationship.""' The federal government is considered to have legal and
moral obligations to the tribes. 4 In other words, the tribes look at the
federal government as their guardian. The responsibility of the federal
government to the tribes is enforced and carried out by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, which is a section of the Department of Interior."°5 In
other words, the Secretary of the Interior is responsible for taking care
of the federal government's duty to the tribes.' 6
The same Secretary is now responsible for determining whether a
state negotiated in good faith with a tribe for a gaming compact." The
Secretary is faced with a conflict of interest. There is no possible way it
can fulfill both roles: (1) the guardian of a dependent ward, and (2) the
neutral factfinder between that ward and a state.
The Secretary also relies on common law for authority to create
these rules."' The Secretary first cites the circuit court opinion in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida."° In this opinion, the Eleventh Circuit alludes
to the idea of the Secretary prescribing regulations in the absence of a
tribal-state compact.1 On appeal, the Supreme Court never addressed
this issue."'
The Ninth Circuit is the only other court to address this issue."' It
pointedly criticized the Eleventh Circuit's opinion." The Ninth Circuit
100. Class III Gaming Procedures, 25 C.F.R. § 291 (2000).
101. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(iii) (1994).
102. See supra Section II.
103. Md
104. See supra Section III.
105. Class III Gaming Procedures, 64 Fed. Reg. 17,535-17,536 (April 12, 1999).
106. See Laxague, supra note 68, at 87.
107. 25 C.F.R. § 291.11 (2000).
108. See Laxague, supra note 68, at 83-85.
109. Id. at 83-84.
110. Id.
111. Id at 84.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 85.
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stated that, "such a result would pervert the congressional plan."114 The
court stated that the Secretary of the Interior under the statute is to act
only as a matter of last resort, after a finding of bad faith on the behalf
of the state, and then only after consulting with the court appointed
mediator who has become familiar with the positions and interests of
both the tribes and the states in court directed negotiations."5
The Secretary's new regulations defeat the purpose of the IGRA.
The clear intent of the IGRA was to bring the states into the process of
tribal gaming. 6 When the state asserts an Eleventh Amendment
defense, the tribes are left with no recourse. However, in the new
regulations, when a state claims it has negotiated in good faith to no
avail, the only recourse it is left with is a biased factfinder who can do
what it wants without any state input. Obviously, a better solution is
needed.
IV. OTHER OPTIONS THAT ARE NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
A. Why Do We Not Just Trust the States to Negotiate in Good Faith?
The IGRA compacting provision, as well as the one in the
Secretary's recent regulations, attempt to bridge the division that has
always existed between tribes and states."7 It requires alternative
dispute resolution, with litigation as a last resort used only if bad faith
exists. The hope is that because the process is not constrained by strict
legal rules, the parties should be able to reach a "sensible compromise"
outside the adversarial context of the courtroom."'
What happened to this good-feeling hope? To begin with, the
obligation to negotiate in good faith is problematic. The parties have a
historically antagonistic relationship, and some states perceive Indian
gaming as detrimental to their own interests."' Many tribes see the
states' main objective as "undermining... the tribes' very existence." 2°
During the last several years, tribes and states have litigated over such
114. Id. at 84. (quoting WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 225, 310 (3d
ed. 1998)).
115. Id.
116. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B) (1994).
117. See Tsosie, supra note 2, at 67.
118. Id. at 66.
119. Id. at 72.
120. Id. (quoting Frank R. Pommersheim, Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future?
36 S.D. L. REV. 239, 269 (1991)).
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things as taxes, cigarettes, and land.21 Both parties expect the worst
from the other.
The tribes are used to being uniquely federal entities, subject only to
federal law. States do not always look at the tribe's enterprises as a
benefit to the state. They are both here to stay, however, and they need
to work together.
The IGRA standards "embod[y] a model of negotiated agreement
between tribes and states in which each is given some opportunity to
promote its interests, while neither is given an opportunity to ...
disregard the other's interests." "
The states' interests in negotiating a compact are the safety of the
"state['s] citizens from immoral or illegal activit[ies]."' 3 They are also
concerned with preserving "state economies from unfair competition
from tribal gaming enterprises. '"' 24 The tribe's interests are the need to
preserve tribal sovereignty and at the same time build tribal economies.
The IGRA attempts to make these two adversarial parties work
together.'2' It is an attempt to "facilitate an intercultural dialogue
between sovereign governments that replicates, in some ways,
negotiations among international sovereigns." '
Unfortunately, the historical antagonism between the states and
tribes did not cause the foresight for the problems that happened with
the IGRA.
B. Some Constitutional Solutions
Before the Secretary approved these regulations, many other
solutions were offered. The most simple and obvious would be for the
states to waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. This
would allow a judicial factfinder to determine if there is bad faith on the
part of the state.
This is not likely to happen. In lieu of this, Professor Kit Kinports
has suggested "a revival of the doctrine of implied waiver, which would
regard the states as having impliedly waived their immunity from suit in
federal court by agreeing to participate in certain kinds of federal
121. Id.
122. Id. at 91.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
programs." 127 This is one possible solution, but has not ever really been
considered by any court.
Another option put forth has been the forum-allocation principle.'2
This solution seems more problematic. This concept expresses the idea
that "the current Eleventh Amendment doctrine may operate primarily
to control the power of the federal trial courts to hear state-party claims
as an original matter."129 There are two parts to his proposed legislation.
First, create legislation that would "empower the state courts to hear all
federal claims against the states that the Eleventh Amendment places
beyond the reach of the federal district courts."'3' Second, his proposed
legislation would "empower litigants to appeal final state-court decisions
to the intermediate federal appellate courts." "' The major problem with
this solution is that tribes, are reluctant to resort to this because they do
not feel they will get a fair judgment fighting a state in that same state's
court.
Several scholars have suggested reliance upon the "abrogation
authority of the Fourteenth Amendment" to make provision for the
enforcement of rights created under grants of power, "such as the
Commerce and Intellectual Property Clause," and in this case, the
Indian Commerce Clause.32
A last possible solution would be to recognize a federal duty to
litigate on behalf to the Indian tribes. Relying on Chemehuevi Indian
Tribe v. Wilson, Joe Laxague argues that this is the only solution.'33 In
Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, the Governor of California refused to
negotiate a gaming compact.1 The tribe, claiming bad faith on the
state's part, "requested [that] the U.S. Attorney for the Northern
District of California and the U.S. Department of Justice to represent
them in a suit to compel [the state] to begin good faith negotiations over
Class III gaming" procedures.'35 "Relying on the intent behind the
127. Pfander, supra note 70, at 164-165.
128. Id. at 165.
129. Id.
130. Id at 161.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 164.
133. See Laxague, supra note 68, at 91-94. See this article for an in-depth discussion of
the Chemehuevi case and Laxague's solution to the states asserting an Eleventh Amendment
immunity defense. Id.
134. See Chemehuevi Indian Tribe v. Wilson, 987 F. Supp. 804, 805 (N.D. Cal. 1997); see
also, Laxague, supra note 68, at 91.
135. See Chemehuevi Indian Tribe, 987 F. Supp. at 806; see also, Laxague, supra note 68,
at 91-92.
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IGRA and the nature of the federal government's fiduciary duty to the
tribes, [the Judge] declared that the United States had a mandatory duty
to prosecute an action against the State of California on behalf of the
tribes in order to enforce their rights under the IGRA to negotiate for a
gaming compact."1" This appears to be one of the most legally sound
and fair of all possible solutions.
V. CONCLUSION
States and tribes have an adversarial history, which is longer than
almost any two parties that exist today. In the confusion resulting from
the Seminole decision and the Secretary's new regulations, it is easy to
overlook the fact that hundreds of tribal state contracts have been
negotiated successfully. The federal government, in creating IGRA,
tried to force the parties to consider the needs of the other. When this is
not allowed to happen, the intent of the IGRA is invalidated. The new
regulations give the Secretary of the Interior even more power, further
skewing the balance intended by the creation of the IGRA. It is
important that we preserve the intent of the IGRA through a legal and
Constitutional solution.
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